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I. INTRODUCTION 
Originalism has a problem. It grounds its legitimacy in being the method 
that most constrains judges from exercising arbitrary discretion. Yet, when 
faced with conflicting historical evidence favoring both broad and narrow 
readings of constitutional provisions, originalists have no principled way of 
choosing between the two. They must make an arbitrary decision. This 
undermines originalism’s legitimacy.  
An originalist set of rules for picking the proper level of generality 
(“Generality”) by which to interpret constitutional provisions will improve 
originalism. Such rules will prevent judges from exercising arbitrary discretion 
when faced with conflicting historical evidence favoring competing 
Generalities. They will underscore originalism’s claim of being the most 
constraining constitutional interpretive method. 
This paper sets out to find that set of rules. Part II explores originalism’s 
underlying principles. Any originalist rules for instructing one at what 
Generality to interpret the Constitution must ground themselves in these 
principles. Part III examines the prevailing originalist methodology for choosing 
a constitutional provision’s Generality. It then illustrates why this methodology 
is problematic. Part IV argues for a new methodology: Originalists should look 
to the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to develop presumptions of Generality. 
Part V concludes.  
II. PRINCIPLES OF ORIGINALISM: A GUIDE FOR FINDING A RULE  
To find originalist Generality rules for interpreting the Constitution, it is 
first necessary to explore originalism’s underlying principles. Any originalist 
rules will ground themselves in these principles. This section highlights two 
fundamental principles of originalism: (1) originalists interpret the Constitution 
according to the original public meaning of the document’s text; and, (2) 
originalism is a constraining methodology seeking to prevent judges from 
engaging in results-oriented decision-making. Hence, originalist Generality 
rules must ground themselves in the Constitution’s text and must be neutral 
principles.  
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A. The Original Public Meaning of the Constitution’s Text 
Originalists interpret the Constitution according to the original public 
meaning of the document’s text. Although some originalists argue the 
Constitution must be interpreted according to the intentions of its drafters,1 this 
is a minority viewpoint.2 Most originalists “treat[] a constitution like a statute, 
and give[] it the meaning that its words were understood to bear at the time they 
were promulgated.”3 They do not care about drafters’ intent.4 Although 
originalists consult historical works within this framework, such as The 
Federalist Papers or comments from state ratification conventions, these works 
are not used for ascertaining drafters’ intent. Originalists consult them to shed 
light on how the public originally understood the Constitution’s text.5 
This framework provides guidance for developing originalist Generality 
rules. Such rules must ground themselves in the Constitution’s original 
meaning. They can allow for expectations that the Framers would not have 
anticipated, so long as they are consistent with the Constitution’s text. And to 
develop these rules, we will need to consult historical works, but only to the 
extent that they clarify the Constitution’s original meaning.  
B. Neutral Principles and Originalism 
Originalists also ground their decision-making in neutral principles.6 They 
argue their method is a neutral approach that restrains judges.7 It is upon this 
 
 1 See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1997) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment 
should be interpreted according to the drafter’s original intent).  
 2 Christopher Scalia, Get Ready for a Flood of Falsehoods About Originalism, WALL 
ST. J. (Oct. 11, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/get-ready-for-a-flood-of-falsehoods-
about-originalism-11602446778 (noting that interpreting the Constitution according to the 
original meaning of the document’s text is “[t]he dominant form of originalism.”); Thomas 
B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J., 713, 720–30 (2011) 
(discussing how originalists reject a search for subjective intent and instead seek objective 
meaning). 
 3 Antonin Scalia, A Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, Remarks at The Catholic 
University of America (Oct. 18, 1996).  
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 The idea of neutral principles comes from Herbert Wechsler. See Herbert Wechsler, 
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19 (1959) (stating 
“[a] principled decision, in the sense that I have in mind, is one that rests on reasons with 
respect to all the issues in the case, reasons that in their generality and their neutrality 
transcend any immediate result that is involved.”).  
 7 Michael W. McConnell, Active Liberty: A Progressive Alternative to Textualism and 
Originalism?, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2415 (2006) (stating that originalism “supplies an 
objective basis for judgment that does not merely reflect the judge’s own ideological stance” 
which is contrary to interpretive methodologies allowing for “constitutional interpretation 
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neutrality that originalists see their method as being the most legitimate.8 
Interpretive rules employed by originalists must, therefore, restrain judges 
against results-oriented decision-making. Otherwise, they risk undermining the 
basis of originalism’s legitimacy.9  
Neutral principles uphold originalism’s adherence to constraining judges 
because they transcend the outcome of any case. For a principle to be neutral, it 
must be general enough to apply to multiple cases before a court.10 If a principle 
cannot transcend application to a single case, it cannot be used to decide any 
case.11 Neutral principles restrain judges from acting in an ad hoc manner and 
turning courts into “naked power organ[s].”12 Originalists using neutral 
principles in their decision-making maintain the basis of their methodology’s 
legitimacy—that it is an objective and neutral methodology. Of course, to be 
consistent with originalism, originalists need to ground their neutral principles 
in the original meaning of the Constitution’s text.13  
C. An Originalist Formula 
An originalist rule for determining Generality must have the following 
elements to be consistent with the methodology’s underlying principles: (1) it 
must be derived from the original meaning of the Constitution’s text; and, (2) it 
must be a neutral principle. Any other approach risks undermining originalism’s 
claim of being the most constraining methodology. 
Originalism does not currently have such a set of rules. Consider the 
following criticism of the current originalist approach to Generality:  
[O]riginalists often seem to vary the level of generality at which they seek 
constitutional meaning in a way that cannot be explained simply by reference to 
the level of generality at which the constitutional text is expressed. Indeed, in 
practice the decision appears ad hoc, largely unconstrained, and thus susceptible 
to the same kind of results-oriented decision-making that originalists have long 
decried.14 
 
based on the judge’s assessment of worthy purposes and propitious consequences that lacks 
objectivity.”). 
 8 See Lillian R. BeVier, The Integrity and Impersonality of Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 283, 286 (1996) (“Originalists tend to ground their arguments primarily on a 
foundation of legitimacy.”). 
 9 Justice Scalia recognized the importance of neutral principles to originalists, arguing 
that “judges have a duty to anchor their decisions in clear rules that can be applied broadly.” 
ANTONIN SCALIA, THE ESSENTIAL SCALIA: ON THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND THE 
RULE OF LAW 3 (2020). 
 10 Wechsler, supra note 6. 
 11 Id.  
 12 Id. at 12. 
 13 See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 
IND. L. J. 1, 8 (1971); see supra Part II.A.  
 14 Peter J. Smith, Originalism and Level of Generality, 51 GA. L. REV. 1, 10 (2017).  
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This criticism highlights originalists’ urgent need to develop Generality 
rules consistent with their underlying principles. Absent the development of 
such rules, originalism risks undermining its claim to being the most 
constraining method.  
III. THE PREDOMINANT ORIGINALIST METHOD FOR DETERMINING 
APPROPRIATE LEVELS OF GENERALITY 
Before we ascertain originalist Generality rules, we must better understand 
originalists’ current method for selecting Generality. This section overviews 
that methodology, and then illustrates its shortcomings with an example.  
A. A Simple Look to a Constitutional Provision’s Original Meaning 
Most originalists simply look to a constitutional provision’s original public 
meaning to determine the appropriate Generality.15 “[T]he degree of generality 
is itself an historical question.”16 In engaging in this historical inquiry, the 
originalist asks: “[H]ow general was a term or phrase at the time it was used?”17 
The answer to this question lies in the reasonably understood meaning of a 
constitutional provision at the time of its adoption.18 Constitutional provisions 
must be applied at whatever Generality the original meaning of the text 
commands.  
This methodology, however, is problematic because it does not necessarily 
constrain judges to construing a single Generality. If historical evidence 
supports reading a constitutional provision at high and low Generality, both 
readings are acceptable. This is where the rule fails within the originalist 
framework. As long as judges can support their preferred Generality with 
historical evidence, they are not constrained in their decision-making.19  
B. Originalism’s Generality Problem: An Illustration 
Consider, for example, two competing arguments regarding the proper 
Generality at which to interpret the Equal Protection Clause. The first, using the 
current originalist framework, argues that one must interpret the Equal 
Protection Clause broadly. The second argument—using the same exact 
methodology—argues one must interpret the Equal Protection Clause narrowly.  
 
 15 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 
644 (1999).  
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 See infra Part III.B. 
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1. An Originalist Argument for Reading the Equal Protection Clause 
Broadly 
Original meaning arguments support reading the Equal Protection Clause at 
a high Generality. One such reading gives us the following rule: “[A] principal 
purpose and consequence of the Equal Protection Clause’s adoption was to deny 
states the power to pass ‘caste’ legislation creating classes of legally inferior 
persons based on arbitrary characteristics such as race, color, creed, or 
orientation.”20  
One can derive this rule from typical originalist sources of authority. A 
contrast of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 with the Equal Protection Clause 
suggests the latter forbids any legislation creating classes of legally inferior 
persons. The states ratified the Equal Protection Clause two years after Congress 
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866. In this Act, Congress “sought to afford 
‘citizens of the United States . . . of every race and color’ the same rights and 
benefits as enjoyed ‘by white citizens.’”21 Stated otherwise, Congress wanted 
to eliminate legally inferior racial classes. They generalized this principle when 
they embodied it in the Equal Protection Clause. Rather than forbidding legally 
inferior racial classes, Congress banned legally inferior classes of all types. The 
Equal Protection Clause extends protection of the laws to “any person.”22 
Moreover, Congress rejected proposals to limit the Equal Protection Clause to 
race-based classifications.23 Contemporary media also described the Equal 
Protection Clause at a high Generality. Take, for example, statements in the 
Cincinnati Commercial describing the Equal Protection Clause. These 
statements said the Equal Protection Clause “would place ‘[everybody] 
throughout the land upon the same footing of equality before the law, in order 
to prevent unequal legislation.’ It predicted that once the amendment took effect, 
‘it [would] be impossible for any Legislature to enact special codes for one class 
of citizens.’” 24 An originalist—using the current originalist methodology for 
determining Generality—can reasonably argue for a broad reading of the Equal 
Protection Clause.  
 
 20 Brief for Amici Curiae Cato Institute, William Eskridge Jr., and Steven Calabresi in 
Support of Petitioners at 5, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (No. 14-556) 
[hereinafter Cato Brief]. 
 21 Id. at 13 (citing the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27) 
(emphasis added).  
 22 Id. (citing Robert J. Reinstein, Completing the Constitution: The Declaration of 
Independence, Bill of Rights, and Fourteenth Amendment, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 361, 383–92 
(1993)).  
 23 BENJAMIN B. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON 
RECONSTRUCTION 46, 50, 83, 90–91, 97–100 (1914). 
 24 Cato Brief, supra note 20, at 15. (citing The Constitutional Amendment, CIN. 
COMMERCIAL, Aug. 20, 1866 at 2, 4). 
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2. An Originalist Argument for Reading the Equal Protection Clause 
Narrowly 
An original meaning argument can also support reading the Equal 
Protection Clause at a low Generality. Consider one such reading: Judges should 
understand The Equal Protection Clause to be a narrow response to slavery, only 
prohibiting legally inferior racial classes.25 It does not protect against legislation 
making other classes legally inferior.26  
This narrow reading of the Equal Protection Clause, like the broad reading, 
finds support in originalist sources of authority. The Supreme Court—staffed 
by justices alive when the states ratified the Fourteenth Amendment—held this 
position in 1872. Referencing the Equal Protection Clause, the Court held “it is 
not difficult to give meaning to this clause . . . [i]t is so clearly a provision for 
race and that emergency.”27 In light of this view, the Court found it unlikely the 
Equal Protection Clause was meant to apply to other legal classifications when 
it was ratified.28 Additionally, other historical accounts of the Fourteenth 
Amendment argue Congress meant for it to constitutionalize the provisions of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866—not add on to them.29 Recall that the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866 explicitly limited its scope to race-based classifications.30 Viewed 
in this context, the Equal Protection Clause’s scope is no wider. An originalist—
using the same methodology as above—can argue the Equal Protection Clause’s 
drafters intended for it to read narrowly. 
3. The Problem Illustrated 
Both preceding arguments are rooted in the original meaning of the 
Constitution’s text. Yet they reach different conclusions regarding the proper 
Generality for interpreting the Equal Protection Clause. This illustrates 
originalism’s problem when construing Generality—its prevailing rule for 
doing so does not always constrain judges. The original meaning can convey 
ambiguous instructions for what Generality at which one must interpret a 
provision. And when the original meaning is ambiguous, judges can make 
arbitrary decisions. There is no neutral principle for choosing one Generality 
over another. If originalists want to improve upon the claim that their 
methodology is the most constraining, they must look for originalist sources to 
remove this discretion.  
 
 25 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARDNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS 88 (2012). 
 26 See id. 
 27 The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 81 (1872).  
 28 See id.  
 29 See Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. 
L. REV. 947, 958 (1995). 
 30 Id. at 957–58. 
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IV. PRESUMPTIONS OF GENERALITY IN THE NINTH AND TENTH 
AMENDMENTS 
The Ninth and Tenth Amendments, read according to their original 
meaning, give originalists neutral principles for construing Generality in the 
Constitution. Indeed, looking beyond the original meaning of just the 
constitutional provision in question—and including the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments in interpretive questions—makes for more effective readings of 
the document.31 The Ninth Amendment helps the originalist when reading the 
Constitution’s rights recognition provisions. When the scope of such a provision 
is ambiguous, it instructs one to presume that reading it at a higher Generality 
is proper. Meanwhile, the Tenth Amendment helps the originalist when reading 
the Constitution’s provisions allocating power to the federal government. It 
instructs one to presume that reading such a provision at a lower Generality is 
proper. By employing the Generality presumptions in the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments, originalism can improve upon its claim that it is a constraining 
method. 
A. The Ninth Amendment: A Presumption of Generality for Rights 
Recognizing Provisions of the Constitution 
The Ninth Amendment creates a presumption favoring reading the 
Constitution’s rights recognizing provisions at a high Generality. This 
presumption is evident after exploring the historical background of the 
amendment. Adding this presumption to the originalist toolkit—and eschewing 
competing originalist methods for reading rights—allows the method to choose 
Generalities effectively while adhering to its underlying principles. 
1. History and Original Public Meaning of the Ninth Amendment 
The Constitution’s ratification, at one time, was not a sure thing. The 
Antifederalists had sharp criticisms of the document—criticisms that the 
Federalists needed to address to ensure the Constitution’s ratification.32 The 
Antifederalists expressed particular concern that the new Constitution did not 
contain an enumerated bill of rights.33  
The Federalists countered that a bill of rights would be detrimental to the 
peoples’ liberties.34 Such an inclusion of an enumerated bill of rights, they 
 
 31 SCALIA & GARDNER, supra note 25, at 24 (arguing legal texts must be interpreted as 
a whole).  
 32 See generally, THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST (Herbert J. Storing & Murray Dry 
eds., 1981). 
 33 Randy E. Barnett, A Ninth Amendment for Today’s Constitution, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 
419, 420 (1991).  
 34 THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 420–21 (Alexander Hamilton) (Dover Thrift Ed., 2014).  
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argued, may be construed to mean the people retained no other rights.35 And 
including every right retained by the people would be an impossible task. 
Rights are unenumerable because rights define a private domain within 
which persons have a right to do as they wish, provided their conduct does not 
encroach upon the rightful domains of others. As long as their actions remain 
within this rightful domain, other persons—including the government—should 
not interfere. Because people have a right to do whatever they please within the 
boundaries defined by natural rights, this means that the rights retained by the 
people are limited only by their imagination and could never be completely 
specified or enumerated.36 
Surely, no bill of rights could enumerate every liberty conceivable to the 
imagination. This left the Federalists in quandary: either risk derailing efforts to 
ratify the Constitution or include a bill of rights that, in their view, could 
disparage the people’s unenumerated rights.  
To address this challenge, James Madison developed a simple, yet elegant 
solution. If the Federalists did not want future generations to read an enumerated 
bill of rights as a disparagement of unenumerated rights, why not just leave 
instructions behind telling them not to read the Constitution in such a manner? 
37 And that is exactly what the first Congress did. They sent a bill of rights to 
the states for ratification, assuaging the Antifederalists. But they included an 
amendment instructing progeny how to read this bill of rights: “The enumeration 
in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage 
others retained by the people.”38 
This background shows us the Ninth Amendment’s original meaning—it is 
a rule of construction.39 It tells us what we cannot do when reading the 
Constitution: imply that the enumeration of rights means the denial of 
unenumerated rights.40 It also tells us what we must do when reading the 
Constitution: read enumerated rights broadly.41  
The Framers viewed rights retained by the people as being plentiful—a 
body so vast, it could not be wholly contemplated.42 This vision of plentiful 
rights retained by the people is what alarmed the Antifederalists about a bill of 
rights in the first place.43 They worried they could not possibly enumerate every 
right retained by the people. By acknowledging this, they implicitly conceded 
 
 35 Id.  
 36 Barnett, supra note 33, at 425. 
 37 Id. at 456.  
 38 U.S. Const. amend. IX.  
 39 THOMAS HART BENTON, ABRIDGMENT OF THE DEBATES OF CONGRESS FROM 1789 TO 
1856 278 (1857) (recording James Madison’s argument that the Ninth Amendment [proposed 
as the Eleventh Amendment] should be read as a canon of construction against reading the 
Constitution’s provision in a manner that would infringe upon citizens’ rights).  
 40 See U.S. Const. amend. IX.  
 41 Infra Part IV.A.2.  
 42 See Barnett, supra note 33, at 425. 
 43 See id.  
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that the people retained rights they could not contemplate. Future generations 
would find rights the Framers would never have anticipated ending up in the 
Constitution. The Framers’ vision of rights—expressed in the original meaning 
of the Ninth Amendment—was a vision of an ever-growing body of rights that 
could never be wholly defined. Any true originalist must follow the Ninth 
Amendment’s command.  
Scholars have argued for various methods to develop this vast body of 
rights.44 A discussion of those various methods is beyond the scope of this 
paper. Yet, we need not discuss methods for determining rights under the Ninth 
Amendment to make a simple acknowledgement: The Framers left us with an 
incomplete list of enumerated rights in the Constitution from which to start our 
search. Any construction of the Bill of Rights, to be consistent with the Ninth 
Amendment, requires us to read these enumerated rights broadly. This broad 
reading helps us develop the vast body of unenumerated rights envisioned by 
the Framers. A contrary reading is inconsistent with the Framers’ original 
understanding of the Ninth Amendment.  
2. The Ninth Amendment Presumption 
Applying the Ninth Amendment’s command to read rights broadly leaves 
us with a rule of construction for determining Generality: The Ninth 
Amendment creates a presumption of higher Generality when reading the 
Constitution’s rights recognizing provisions. Originalists should apply this 
presumption when a rights recognizing provision’s original meaning reasonably 
supports multiple Generalities. Hence, this presumption will kick in when the 
original meaning of a provision’s Generality is ambiguous. Under such 
circumstances, the Ninth Amendment presumption kicks in and instructs the 
reader to choose the higher Generality. 
Adding this Ninth Amendment presumption to the originalist’s toolkit gives 
the method a more effective manner for construing Generality.45 For starters, 
this presumption is grounded in the Constitution’s original meaning, so it is 
consistent with originalism. It also gives judges a neutral principle to abide by 
when faced with discretionary decisions. When a provision’s Generality is 
ambiguous, the originalist judge can invoke the Ninth Amendment presumption 
and choose the higher Generality. Employing this presumption allows the 
originalist judge to eliminate discretion from their decision and support the 
notion that originalism is a constraining methodology. 
The Ninth Amendment presumption is a neutral principle for originalists to 
apply that is both constraining and consistent with the Constitution’s original 
meaning. However, to be evaluated effectively, it must be compared to 
 
 44 See generally, Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 
TEX. L. REV. 1 (2006) (discussing the various originalist methods for developing the body 
of rights envisioned by the Ninth Amendment). 
 45 See supra Part III.  
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originalism’s leading Generality rule regarding constitutional rights: Justice 
Scalia’s footnote 6.  
3. Contrasting the Ninth Amendment Presumption with Justice Scalia’s 
Footnote 6 
Justice Scalia articulated the following rule for selecting the Generality of 
fundamental rights: Judges must “refer to the most specific level at which a 
relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be 
identified.”46 This rule came to be known simply as “footnote 6.”47 Justice 
Scalia aimed to accomplish the same goal of this paper—constrain judges 
determining proper Generalities—when he crafted footnote 6. Hence, 
originalists reading this paper must ask themselves: Is footnote 6’s framework 
better for selecting the proper Generality of rights than the Ninth Amendment 
presumption? To answer this question, we will analyze footnote 6 in the context 
of the Bill of Rights and fundamental rights.  
a. Footnote 6 and the Bill of Rights 
Although footnote 6 is a rule for reading fundamental rights, one can extend 
its underlying logic when seeking proper Generalities of rights enumerated in 
the Bill of Rights. Such an extension gives us the following rule: Judges should 
read the Bill of Rights at the “most specific level” to avoid exercising arbitrary 
discretionary power. When an originalist faces competing Generalities by which 
to read one of the first eight amendments, this rule instructs them to choose the 
narrowest reading of the right. It is a presumption of reading enumerated rights 
narrowly.  
Yet Justice Scalia himself would have rejected extending footnote 6’s logic 
to create such a presumption. His opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller48 
illustrates this. In Heller, the Supreme Court contemplated reading the Second 
Amendment at two competing Generalities. On the one hand, Justice Stevens 
argued in dissent for a specific reading of the Second Amendment—one that 
only protected the right to own a firearm in connection with the maintenance of 
“a well-regulated militia.”49 Conversely, Justice Scalia argued for a broader 
reading of the Second Amendment—one that “guarantee[s] the individual right 
to possess and carry weapons,”50 regardless of whether an individual possessed 
the weapon for purposes of being in a militia.  
Each of these readings had originalist support. Although not an originalist, 
Justice Stevens used originalist arguments to advance his position: “There is no 
 
 46 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 (1989) n.6.  
 47 See, e.g., Gregory C. Cook, Footnote 6: Justice Scalia’s Attempt to Impose a Rule of 
Law on Substantive Due Process, 14 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 853, 853–54 (1991). 
 48 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 49 Id. at 637 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 50 Id. at 592.  
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indication that the Framers of the [Second Amendment understood it] to 
enshrine the common-law right of self-defense in the Constitution.”51 
Meanwhile, Justice Scalia argued the Framers recognized an individual right to 
possess a firearm in the Second Amendment as a response to tyrants that banned 
militias by “taking away the people’s arms.”52  
Faced with a narrow and broad reading of the Second Amendment, both of 
which had plausible support in the Constitution’s original meaning, Justice 
Scalia chose the broader reading. He did not extend footnote 6’s logic and adopt 
the narrower reading—that the Second Amendment only confers an individual 
right to own firearms for purposes of being in a militia. In fact, he did the exact 
opposite, starting his analysis by saying “[we] start . . . with a strong 
presumption that the Second Amendment right is exercised individually and 
belongs to all Americans.”53 Hence, he started with a presumption favoring the 
broader reading.  
Justice Scalia started with this presumption of a broader reading after 
analyzing the Bill of Rights. He pointed out that the language “right of the 
people” is not only in the Second Amendment, but also the First Amendment 
and the Fourth Amendment.54 Notably, he also found that “[t]he Ninth 
Amendment uses very similar terminology.”55 After analyzing these provisions, 
Justice Scalia found that each of them is meant to recognize “individual rights” 
broadly held by each citizen, not narrow “collective rights” that are only 
recognized only in connection with communal activities.56 
Justice Scalia’s analysis highlights a key feature of the language of the 
Constitution’s rights recognizing provisions—the amendments’ drafters often 
took pains to ensure future generations would not interpret rights too narrowly. 
Conversely, there is no language in the Constitution cautioning future 
generations from reading rights too broadly. With this dynamic in mind, it 
makes sense for there to be a presumption to read rights broadly.  
And this is exactly what the Ninth Amendment presumption instructs judges 
to do. It embodies original concerns about reading rights too narrowly by giving 
a favorable presumption to broader readings. Justice Scalia used a similar 
rationale when concluding the Second Amendment confers a broad individual 
right to firearm ownership.57 Meanwhile, a footnote 6 presumption would have 
led to the opposite conclusion—a conclusion not supported by themes of the 
Constitution’s text. Indeed, the late Justice Scalia would likely agree that the 
Ninth Amendment presumption is a better canon of construction for originalists 
to use when interpreting enumerated rights in the Bill of Rights.  
 
 51 Id. at 637. 
 52 Id. at 598.  
 53 Id. at 581.  
 54 Heller, 554 U.S. at 579.  
 55 Id. at 579.  
 56 Id. 
 57 See id.  
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b. Footnote 6 and Fundamental Rights 
Is footnote 6, however, a better canon of construction for interpreting 
fundamental rights not enumerated in the Bill of Rights? This was, after all, the 
type of right Justice Scalia had in mind when he crafted footnote 6. Analysis of 
footnote 6 shows that although it purports to be a neutral principle, it suffers 
from the same arbitrary features that it seeks to prevent. Alternatively, the Ninth 
Amendment presumption is rooted in neutral principles, making it a better 
principle to use for interpreting fundamental rights. 
A neutral principle must not only give judges a constraining principle to 
apply when making decisions, but it must also itself be defined by a neutral 
methodology. Otherwise, it is not practically constraining. Judge Bork 
emphasized this requirement when discussing neutral principles, stating: “If 
judges are to avoid imposing their own values upon the rest of us . . . they must 
be neutral [not only in the application of principles, but] as well in the definition 
and the derivation of principles.”58  
Footnote 6 fails this test. Although it constrains judges when they apply it, 
Justice Scalia never explained why judges should constrain themselves by using 
this method. And constraining rules, absent principled explanations, do not 
advance originalism’s goal of supporting the rule of law with neutral 
principles.59 They allow courts to act as “naked power organ[s].”60 
The Ninth Amendment presumption does not have this shortcoming. Like 
footnote 6, it is a constraining rule for originalist judges selecting Generalities. 
But it is a constraining rule rooted in a neutral source—the Ninth Amendment’s 
original meaning.61 It is not arbitrary. The Ninth Amendment presumption 
allows originalist judges to be neutral in both their definition and application of 
a principle. It is a better rule for interpreting fundamental rights. 
4. The Ninth Amendment Presumption: Originalism’s Better Way 
Forward 
The Ninth Amendment’s original meaning tells us the people hold a vast 
body of rights. The Ninth Amendment presumption operationalizes this original 
meaning by telling judges to favor broader readings of rights. Adding this 
presumption to the originalist toolkit gives originalism a constraining neutral 
principle that is consistent with the Constitution’s original meaning—something 
 
 58 Bork, supra note 13, at 7.  
 59 See supra, Part II.2. Consider a rule instructing judges to read even-numbered 
amendments at the highest possible Generality and odd-numbered amendments at the lowest 
possible Generality. Such a bright-line rule constrains judges. When faced with competing 
Generalities regarding an amendment, a judge could not choose their preferred outcome. Yet 
this rule would not support the rule of law. Originalists cannot adopt rules just because they 
are constraining—they must also be rooted in in neutral sources. 
 60 Wechsler, supra note 6, at 12. 
 61 Supra Part IV.A.1. 
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the method has been unable to find up to this point. It legitimizes originalism’s 
claim that it is a constraining method.  
The Ninth Amendment presumption, however, only tells originalists how to 
interpret the Constitution’s rights recognizing provisions. It says nothing about 
what Generality we are to interpret the Constitution’s delegated powers to the 
federal government. For guidance on this task, we must turn to the Tenth 
Amendment. 
B. The Tenth Amendment: A Presumption Against Generality for the 
Constitution’s Federal Power Grants  
The Tenth Amendment creates a presumption for reading the Constitution’s 
federal power grants narrowly. The Framers’ motivations for adding the Tenth 
Amendment show the amendment’s original meaning instructs us to construe 
the federal government’s powers narrowly. This presumption supplements the 
originalist toolkit for effectively construing Generality while adhering to its 
underlying principles. 
1. Historical Background and Original Meaning of the Tenth 
Amendment 
Antifederalists also had concerns about the new Constitution’s lack of an 
express limit on the federal government’s powers. They viewed expansive 
provisions—such as the Necessary and Proper Clause—as allowing for wide 
interpretations of the powers delegated to the federal government.62 Absent an 
express limitation on the powers the new Constitution vested in the federal 
government, Antifederalists feared a strong central government would swallow 
up states’ powers.63 
The Federalists attempted to assuage the concerns of the new Constitution’s 
skeptics.64 They assured states’ ratifying conventions that the new federal 
government would be one of limited and enumerated powers.65 Even Alexander 
 
 62 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 33 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 34, at 149 (noting, 
with colorful language, that the Necessary and Proper clause had “been the source of much 
virulent invective and petulant declamation against the proposed Constitution.”). Consider 
the following concern voiced in an Antifederalist publication: “[T]he omission of [an express 
limitation on the federal government’s powers] when such great devolutions of power are 
proposed, manifests the design of reducing the several States to shadows.” Letters of the 
Centinel No.2, Md. J. (Balt., Md.), Nov. 2, 1787, at 1, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE 
ANTIFEDERALIST, supra note 32, at 143, 146–47.  
 63 See 2 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST, supra note 32, at 143, 146–147. 
 64 Kurt T. Lash, The Original Meaning of an Omission: The Tenth Amendment, Popular 
Sovereignty, and Expressly Delegated Power, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1889, 1906 (2008) 
(showing that “in the state ratifying conventions, the Federalists repeatedly insisted that the 
federal government would have only expressly delegated powers.”).  
 65 See, e.g., The Debates of the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the 
Federal Constitution 140-41 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Phila., J.B. Lippincott Co. 2d ed. 1891) 
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Hamilton—who later would argue for an expansive reading of the federal 
government’s powers—argued the Constitution’s limitations on federal power 
were self-evident.66 The Federalists ultimately won the day, but not 
unconditionally. The Antifederalists wanted the assurances the Federalists 
brought to each state’s ratifying convention put into the Constitution.  
The Antifederalists wanted a guarantee that the new federal government 
would be one of limited and enumerated powers. This guarantee came in the 
form of an amendment. After ratifying the Constitution, several states submitted 
proposals for such an amendment.67 The first Congress embodied these 
proposals in the Tenth Amendment, which reads as follows: “The powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”68  
The final four words of the Tenth Amendment are critical to understanding 
its original meaning. The Framers, including those who drafted the Tenth 
Amendment, were influenced by the work of Emmerich de Vattel’s The Law of 
Nations.69 Vattel argued that because sovereigns are presumed to retain all 
powers not expressly delegated away, those delegated powers must be construed 
narrowly.70 Vattel viewed the sovereign as being a monarch; the Framers, 
however, viewed the people as being sovereign.71 This notion, that the people 
are the sovereign entity, is known as popular sovereignty.72 The Framers 
embodied this concept in the Tenth Amendment’s language when they added 
“or to the people” to the Tenth Amendment.73 By doing so, they addressed 
Antifederalist concerns that the federal government’s powers had no limit. The 
Tenth Amendment, by expressly putting the limits of popular sovereignty in the 
Constitution, ensured the federal government could claim no powers beyond 
those which the people delegated clearly.74 The powers that they did delegate, 
moreover, had to be construed narrowly.75 
 
(documenting comments of Federalist Archibald Maclaine at the North Carolina ratifying 
convention in support of the new Constitution). 
 66 Id. at 362 (documenting the following statement by Alexander Hamilton: 
“[W]hatever is not expressly given to the federal head, is reserved to the members. The truth 
of this principle must strike every intelligent mind.”).  
 67 Lash, supra note 64, at 1916–17.  
 68 U.S. Const. amend. X (emphasis added). 
 69 Lash, supra note 64, at 1909; see generally, EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF 
NATIONS (Charles G. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Inst. Of Wash. 1916) (1758).  
 70 See EMMERICH DE VATTEL, supra note 67 bk. 1, ch. 2 § 16.  
 71 Lash, supra note 64, at 1910; see, e.g., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN 
AMERICA 37 (Henry Reeve trans., 2003) (finding that when “[t]he American Revolution 
broke out, and the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people came out of the townships, and 
took possession of the State . . . [e]very class was enlisted in its cause . . . . [I]t became the 
law of laws.”). 
 72 Lash, supra note 64, at 1910. 
 73 Id. at 1924.  
 74 Id. at 1923.  
 75 Id. at 1924.  
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2. The Tenth Amendment Presumption  
If the Tenth Amendment tells us to read the federal government’s 
enumerated powers narrowly, then, like the Ninth Amendment, it gives us a rule 
of construction for construing Generality: The Tenth Amendment creates a 
presumption of reading the powers delegated to the federal government in the 
Constitution narrowly. This presumption, like the Ninth Amendment 
presumption, is useful to originalists interpreting delegated powers having 
multiple Generalities supported by the Constitution’s original meaning. Under 
such circumstances, the originalist follows the Tenth Amendment presumption 
and chooses the lower Generality.  
This Tenth Amendment presumption bolsters the originalist toolkit, giving 
the methodology an effective means for addressing Generality throughout the 
Constitution. This presumption is consistent with the original meaning of the 
Constitution’s text. The Tenth Amendment, by including “or to the people,” 
incorporated popular sovereignty into the Constitution, encouraging narrower 
constructions of delegated powers. Moreover, this presumption gives 
originalists faced with ambiguity a neutral rule to apply when determining the 
proper Generality at which to interpret the Constitution’s delegated powers. By 
employing this methodology, the originalist judge avoids arbitrary decisions. 
They better adhere to originalism’s principles of being a constraining method.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth and Tenth Amendments give originalists presumptions to deploy 
when determining the Generality of constitutional provisions. These 
presumptions come into play when the original meaning of a constitutional 
provision’s Generality is unclear. If dealing with a rights recognizing provision, 
the Ninth Amendment presumption instructs one to apply it at a higher 
Generality. If the provision is delegating power to the federal government, the 
Tenth Amendment presumption tells one to apply it at a lower Generality. 
These presumptions ground themselves in originalism’s underlying 
principles. They derive themselves from the Constitution’s text, finding support 
in the original meaning of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. And they give 
judges neutral principles to abide by. Unlike the prevailing originalist Generality 
rule, these two presumptions do not undermine originalism’s legitimacy. They 
improve originalism and reinforce its claim to being the most constraining 
method.  
 
